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5. CHINA IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEmENT SySTEm: FROm PASSIvE 
RULE-TAKER TO ACTIvE RULE-mAKER?
Henry Gao 
Singapore Management University
According to the Marrakesh Agreement, the WTO 
has three main functions: trade negotiation, 
trade policy review, and settlement of trade 
disputes. As a new Member, China found that its 
ability to participate in the first two activities 
was subject to severe constraints. For trade 
policy review, the restriction is formalized 
through the Transitional Review Mechanism 
in Section 18 of the Accession Protocol, which 
mandates Chinese commitments to be reviewed 
once every year for the first eight years, with a 
final review in the tenth year after accession. 
One may argue that such a review is different 
from the normal trade policy review in the 
WTO, as both the scopes of the review and 
the bodies conducting them are different. 
Moreover, in reality, the additional burden 
made it difficult for China to participate in 
normal trade policy review activities. During 
the 15-year long accession negotiations, the 
existing WTO Members pressed China for far-
reaching commitments in each area of the 
WTO mandate. As a result, China’s concessions 
on both trade in goods and services greatly 
exceed those of other WTO Members, most of 
which have not changed since the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round. Therefore, when the Doha 
Round was launched, China could not participate 
as effectively as other WTO Members as most 
of its bargaining chips had largely been spent 
during its accession process. This is why China’s 
negotiating proposals in the Doha Round mostly 
cover systematic issues rather than substantive 
market access.
In contrast, WTO dispute settlement is the only 
area in which no restriction was imposed on 
China’s participation from the very beginning. 
Because of this, many commentators predicted 
that the Chinese accession would overburden 
the WTO dispute settlement system with cases 
both against and by China. However, China’s 
participation in the dispute settlement system 
did not turn out exactly as predicted. At least 
for the first five years, China tried to stay away 
from formal dispute settlement activities; and 
only in the second half of the last decade did it 
emerge as a major player. This note will review 
China’s transformation from a reluctant player 
into an aggressive litigant in WTO dispute 
settlement activities, which took place in three 
stages.
5.1  Rule-Taker
From the time of its accession to early 2006, 
China took a cautious approach towards WTO 
litigation. As a newcomer unfamiliar with the 
WTO legal rules, China put more emphasis on 
learning WTO rules than on winning specific 
disputes. In an effort to discourage litigation, 
China usually settled the dispute quickly with 
the complainant once a case was filed or 
threatened, even if it might have had good 
arguments to defend its actions.8 For example, 
in a matter concerning value-added tax rebates 
on integrated circuits, the US made a request 
for consultations in March 2004, and the dispute 
was settled just four months later. The same 
period also saw China cave in only two months 
after the EC threatened to bring a formal WTO 
complaint against China’s export quota regime 
on coke, an essential raw material for the 
production of steel. The climax of this approach 
was reached in the Kraft Linerboard case, in 
which the US complained of inconsistencies 
with the Anti-dumping (AD) Agreement when 
the Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of 
China (MOFCOM) imposed AD duties on US Kraft 
Linerboard imports in September 2005. On 
Friday, 6 January 2006, the US finally threatened 
to file a formal WTO complaint. On the next 
working day—i.e., Monday, 9 January 2006—the 
Chinese government made an announcement to 
scrap the AD duties in this case.
8 For a review of China’s approach towards WTO dispute settlement in this period, see: Gao, H. 2005. ‘Aggressive Legalism: 
The East Asian Experience and Lessons for China’, in China’s Participation in the WTO, Gao, H. and Lewis, D. (eds.). 
London: Cameron May: Pp. 315-351.
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5.2 Rule-Shaker9
To build a better understanding of the dispute 
settlement process, China started to actively 
participate as a third party in real WTO cases 
shortly after its accession. From August 2003 to 
2006, for example, China joined almost every 
panel established during the period as a third 
party. Through its participation as a third party, 
China gained invaluable understanding of the 
WTO dispute settlement system and boosted its 
confidence in participating in the system as a 
main party. Such enhanced confidence was well 
illustrated by the remarks of Minister Bo Xilai 
of MOFCOM in May 2005. When asked whether 
China would bring complaints in the WTO 
against the countries that imposed restrictions 
against Chinese textile exports, Minister Bo Xilai 
responded: 
First, China has the right to resort to WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism. We should 
not hesitate to use this right when needed. 
Second, while bilateral consultation has its 
own benefits, if each side sticks to its own 
view, the problem won’t be solved as there 
is no neutral arbiter. Thus, in addition to one-
to-one consultations, sometimes it’s more 
effective to have the disputes reviewed in the 
multilateral setting. Third, the restrictions 
against Chinese products are inconsistent with 
WTO rules and discriminatory. We strongly 
oppose such measures. Of course, it’s up to 
us to decide whether to take any legal action 
against such measures and when to do so.
Some of the thinking that informed China’s 
more-aggressive new strategy in WTO litigation 
is revealed in the following analysis of Mexico’s 
litigation strategy in the Soft Drinks case10 by 
Dr. Ji Wenhua, an official in charge of dispute 
settlement activities at China’s WTO Mission in 
Geneva. In the article he published in the July 
2006 issue of the China WTO Tribune – a monthly 
journal on trade policy published by MOFCOM and 
edited by Dr. Zhang Xiangchen – then Director-
General of the Treaty and Law Department of 
MOFCOM, Ji noted that Mexico fought an uphill 
battle in the case brought against it by the 
US, but made a good effort defending its case. 
According to Ji: 
In this case, Mexico’s legal position was rather 
weak, but it has made an unrelenting effort 
by raising many arguments which are tenuous 
at best and fighting a losing battle.
While we should not publicly praise such 
litigation strategy and attitude, this case still 
offers us some worthy lessons: under certain 
circumstances, we should try to employ some 
strategies, including resorting to sophistry 
and delay tactics. 
As a respondent, we should try to come up 
with as many factual and legal arguments as 
possible. Even if such arguments are mere 
sophistry, or made for purposes such as 
creating artificial difficulties for the panel, 
gaining sympathies, diverting the attention 
of other parties, or delaying the progress of 
the case, they are justified so long as they 
serve to protect our own interests (Emphasis 
original. Original in Chinese. Translated by 
the author).
Equipped with this enlightened new attitude 
toward the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, 
China has taken a markedly different approach 
since then. The turning point came in March 
2006, when Canada, the EU and the US brought 
a joint-complaint against China in the Auto 
Parts case.11 The complainants accused China 
of violating WTO obligations by treating some 
imported automobile parts as whole-car imports 
and imposing additional charges equivalent to 
the difference between the higher tariff for 
whole-car imports and the lower tariff applicable 
9 For a review of China’s shift in strategy, see: Gao, H. 2007. ‘Taming the Dragon: China’s Experience in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System’, Legal issues of Economic Integration 34(4): 369–392. 
10 Panel Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/R, adopted 24 March 2006, as modified 
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS308/AB/R, DSR 2006:I, 43. 
11 Panel Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R and Add.1 
and Add.2, adopted 12 January 2009, upheld (WT/DS339/R) and as modified (WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R) by Appellate Body 
Reports WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/R.
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to automobile parts. Legally speaking, this is a 
rather simple case as the illegality of the Chinese 
measure seems to be quite obvious, especially as 
China has made specific commitments to impose 
no more than 10 percent tariff on automobile 
parts imports in its accession package. However, 
rather than continuing the old practice of 
settling the dispute privately, China decided not 
to concede defeat without a good fight. Over the 
next two and half years, the case would go all 
the way from the Panel to the Appellate Body 
until the Appellate Body finally issued its report 
in December 2008.
The same aggressive approach was taken in 
several other cases, especially the TRIPS case12 
and the Publications and Audiovisual Products 
case.13 In all these cases, China tried to shake 
or even bend the existing rules by aggressively 
making legal arguments that put its position in 
a better light. This strategy was reflected not 
only in the extensive substantive legal arguments 
China made, but also in its sophisticated use of 
procedural objections. As all good lawyers know, 
while procedural matters may seem mundane, 
they are of no less importance than substantive 
claims: if used well, they can even save a hopeless 
case. Judging from its performance in these cases, 
China has mastered the ‘sophistries’ very well. In 
the TRIPS case, for example, China attacked the 
complainants on such procedural grounds as the 
admissibility of certain evidence14 and the correct 
scope of the measures at issue.15 Similarly, in the 
Publications case, China’s procedural arguments 
included the failure of the US to establish a 
prima facie case,16 the evidentiary standards,17 
and the appropriate scope of the Panel’s terms 
of reference.18 
5.3 Rule-maker
As observed above, while China accepted some 
rather harsh terms as the price for its WTO 
accession, it is likely to be difficult for China 
to change these terms through the multilateral 
negotiation process. This has left China with 
only one option: trying to challenge them and 
soften their negative impacts through creative 
interpretation in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings. 
Among the six cases filed by China since September 
2008, four (US - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties;19 EU – Steel Fasteners;20 US – Tyres;21 and EU 
– Footwear22) were aimed at changing the rules, 
 
In its first decade in the WTO, China 
has successfully made the transition 
from a Member that was reluctant 
or even afraid to use the dispute 
settlement system to one that is 
increasingly confident and skilful 
in using it to advance its legitimate 
interests.
12 Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R, 
adopted 20 March 2009.
13 Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 
Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 January 2010, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/
DS363/AB/R.
14 Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R, 
adopted 20 March 2009. Paras. 6.14-37.
15 Ibid., at paras. 7.1-19. 
16 Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 
Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 January 2010, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/
DS363/AB/R. Paras. 7.458-460. 
17 Ibid., at paras.7.620-632. 
18 Ibid., at para. 7.63. 
19 United States — Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, DS379, Request for 
Consultations received on 19 September 2008. 
20 European Communities — Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, DS397, Request 
for Consultations received on 31 July 2009. 
21 United States — Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China, DS399, Request 
for Consultations received on 14 September 2009
22 European Union — Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China, DS405, Request for Consultations received on 
4 February 2010
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especially the provisions in China’s Accession 
Protocol. For example, in the US — Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties case, China challenged 
the decision by the US authorities to impose 
both AD and countervailing duties against several 
products imported from China. In addition to 
the usual claims under the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Anti-dumping 
Agreement, and the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM), two claims made 
by China are particularly interesting and are 
described in more detail below. 
The first claim is that the US violated China’s 
Accession Protocol by failing to follow the proper 
methodology for the determination of the 
existence and amount of subsidy benefits. Under 
Section 15(b) of China’s Accession Protocol, in 
subsidy investigations, other WTO Members could 
“use methodologies for identifying and measuring 
the subsidy benefit which take into account the 
possibility that prevailing terms and conditions in 
China may not always be available as appropriate 
benchmarks”. Similar to subparagraph (a) of the 
same Section, which allows other WTO Members 
to use surrogate prices in AD investigations 
against Chinese firms, this provision was 
introduced to address the concern that prices 
in China do not reflect the true cost as China is 
not yet a full market economy. However, unlike 
the non-market economy (NME) status in AD 
investigations, which is scheduled to expire 15 
years after China’s accession, the alternative 
benchmark methodology does not have an 
expiration date. Thus, theoretically speaking, 
the alternative benchmark methodology could be 
invoked even 100 years after China’s accession to 
the WTO. As discussed above, it would have been 
very hard for China to try to change this provision 
in its accession terms through negotiations in 
the WTO. Instead, China decided to limit the 
applicability of the provision by giving teeth to 
some seemingly innocuous terms in the provision: 
first, the US failed to make a finding that there 
were “special difficulties” in applying the 
prevailing terms and conditions in China as the 
basis for the determination of the existence of 
benefits; and second, the US failed to notify the 
SCM Committee of the methodologies it used. 
This is a very clever way to try to reduce the 
utility of the provision. Unfortunately, during the 
Panel proceeding, China decided to not pursue 
this claim.23 However, if the issue arises again 
and a future Panel indeed chooses to give a strict 
interpretation of the term “special difficulties”, 
this might greatly reduce the attractiveness of the 
provision and even effectively render it void.  
The second claim is that the US violated the relevant 
provisions in the Anti-dumping and Safeguards 
Agreements through its dual application of both 
AD and countervailing duties against the same 
products. While the same product may be subject 
to both AD and SCM investigations, in practice, the 
US has always avoided the imposition of both AD 
and countervailing duties for the same products 
if they are imported from market economies. 
However, non-market economies do not receive 
the same treatment and may be subject to both 
AD and countervailing duties. Under Article VI.5 
of the GATT, WTO Members are prohibited from 
applying both AD and countervailing duties to the 
same products in the same case. However, the 
same provision also states that the prohibition 
of dual application only applies to cases of 
export subsidies and does not include actionable 
domestic subsidies, thus inapplicable to the 
alleged subsidies to Chinese products. However, 
one may also argue that to the extent that the 
dual application results in over-compensation, 
this might result in inconsistencies with the 
“lesser duty rule” under both the AD and SCM 
Agreements. In summary, the rules as they 
currently stand are unclear. Therefore, China 
hopes to clarify the rules or even make new rules 
through this case. As the expiration date for non-
market economy status in AD investigations draws 
closer, subsidy investigations will become the 
main problem facing Chinese firms. Hopefully, 
through the clarification of these terms in 
dispute settlement activities, China will be able 
to change the rules in its favour so that its firms 
will have an easier time when this issue arises in 
the future.24  
23 Panel Report, United States — Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/
DS379/R, adopted 25 March 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS379/AB/R, paras. 10.9-10.12. 
24 This was confirmed by the Appellate Body. See Appellate Body Report, United States — Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 25 March 2011, paras. 592-610.
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Similarly, both the tyres safeguard case against 
the US and the two AD cases against the EU 
involve claims of violation of the individual 
clauses authorizing the respective trade remedy 
measures in China’s Accession Protocol. While 
China has only scored mixed success in these 
cases, they still help to clarify the ambiguous 
terms used in the Accession Protocol. It is not 
unlikely that, in future cases, these provisions 
could be interpreted in a way that would 
restrict the utility of these provisions in the 
future. Should this be the case, China would 
have effectively changed the rules through the 
WTO dispute settlement process.
5.4 What Lies Ahead?
As can be seen from the discussion above, in its 
first decade in the WTO, China has successfully 
made the transition from a Member that was 
reluctant or even afraid to use the dispute 
settlement system to one that is increasingly 
confident and skilful in using it to advance its 
legitimate interests. Will this trend continue into 
the future? I think this is highly likely. In a way, 
this is simply the continuation of established 
patterns in the WTO: over the history of the 
GATT/WTO, it is rare to find cases in which the 
two largest Members, i.e., the US and the EC, 
are not involved in some capacity. It is only 
natural that we would find China, the next big 
trader, receiving the same treatment. While 
some commentators might lament the extra 
burden these cases would add to the WTO 
dispute settlement system, I would argue that 
they should be viewed in a more positive light: 
as history has shown us, it is much better for 
the big players to fight the legal battle within a 
rule-based multilateral framework than to try to 
take justice in their own hands by resorting to 
unilateral measures.
